down the wrong man at Stockwell tube
Was the armed team ordered to kill Hussain
Osman because he knew too much?
Gatenby, Possum News Network,
20 August 2005
In a way,
Hussain Osman alleged to be one of the failed 21/7
London bombers is a lucky man. If it wasnt for an operational
blunder hed be a dead man today. The only logical way to read
the facts that have now been established about the shooting of Jean
Charles de Menezes is that Osman was supposed to be shot dead on 22
July. In his stead, the police (or perhaps a military team, seconded
to the police) took down the hapless Brazilian electrician by mistake.
Ian Blair, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, will come under pressure
to explain how a sophisticated police operation went so badly wrong.
Wrote Daniel McGrory and Stewart Tendler in The Times of 17 August.
But the real issue is this: exactly which aspect of the operation went
wrong: the shooting or the identification of the target?
that de Menezes, wrongly identified as Hussain Osman, was dressed in
close-fitting clothing jeans and a denim jacket and not
carrying anything, there is absolutely no possibility that the surveillance
team or the firearms team could have considered he was carrying a bomb.
to some honest reporting by ITV and to leaks by an unknown investigator
with a conscience, we now know de Menezes behaviour during his
trip to the station and at the station suggested nothing suspicious.
He simply walked into the station from the bus. He did not, as the police
at first alleged, run into the station or leap over the ticket barrier
after being challenged. He even stopped to pick up a free newspaper.
Reports that he was chased onto the train with the armed team in hot
pursuit have been exposed as nonsense.
from the suspicion that a bulky jacket might conceal a bomb, I can think
of only one other semi-legitimate reason why the firearms team might
have been justified in using lethal force: de Menezes could possibly
have been carrying a gun in a shoulder holster or tucked into the waistband
of his jeans in the small of the back. But even in that case there was
no reason for the shoot-to-the-head procedure when he was confronted
on the train. When the shots were fired he had already been restrained
by a plain-clothes surveillance man who led the four-man firearms team
onto the train. There was no danger of him drawing a pistol even in
the unlikely event he was carrying one.
to the statement of the surveillance team member reported in The Times:
grabbed the male in the denim jacket by wrapping both my arms around
his torso, pinning his arms to his side.I then pushed him back on
to the seat where he had been previously sitting ... I heard a gunshot
very close to my left ear and was dragged away on to the floor of
all these facts, the behaviour of the firearms team was consistent with
absolute determination to shoot the subject dead.
reported that the firearms team believed that de Menezes was in fact
Hussain Osman, one of the alleged 21/7 bombers. The striking fact is
that they deliberately and cold-bloodedly killed the man they believed
to be Osman even though they had already determined he could not be
carrying a bomb and while he was pinioned and in no position to draw
obvious conclusion is that they were under orders to kill Osman, but
why? Why kill him if he could easily be arrested and might, under interrogation,
reveal more about the plot and his accomplices?
the highly-trained firearms team was actually composed of psychopaths
so eager to actually kill somebody that they collectively threw away
any opportunity to exercise judgement on whether Osman/de Menezes presented
a danger to the public or we must conclude that they were under orders
to kill the subject regardless.
the only logical reason for killing Osman is that whoever arranged the
killing knew that whatever Osman might have said under interrogation
would lead to the conclusion that the failed 21/7 bombings
and possibly the 7/7 bombings were false flag operations.
respect The Times is guilty of obfuscation when it places emphasis on
the supposed failure of the undercover officer with the camera at the
block of flats where de Menezes lived to have videotaped him leaving
the flats for identification purposes. The Times reported:
advice was "it would be worth someone else having a look"
to ensure that they had the right man. No other officer apparently
took a picture of him even though de Menezes had to take a bus journey
to the station. Even so, Gold Command at Scotland Yard, which was
running this operation, declared a code red and handed
responsibility to CO19 the firearms team.
armed team had been given photographs of the alleged bombers yet no
one realised that de Menezes bore no resemblance to them.
investigation report states that the firearms unit of the police had
been told that "unusual tactics" might be required and if
they "were deployed to intercept a subject and there was an opportunity
to challenge, but if the subject was non-compliant, a critical shot
may be taken".
whole tragic series of blunders spin smacks of a further
attempt at cover-up. The surveillance man who was supposed to have videotaped
the subject (but failed to activate his equipment because he was relieving
himself at the moment de Menezes left the building) would have been
videotaping in order to gather evidence for later use. His role would
have had nothing to do with the actual identification of the subject
on that morning because everybody taking part was in possession of photos
of the alleged bombers. The problem was, the armed team, acting like
a bunch of amateur hit-men, failed to confirm they had the right man.
in the matter of whether to take lethal action it should have made absolutely
no difference whether the subject was or was not Hussain Osman, because
simple observation would have confirmed that there was no way he could
be wearing a bomb and very little chance of him concealing a firearm.
When confronted, de Menezes was never challenged and never given the
slightest opportunity to demonstrate he was non-compliant,
which, ostensibly, were the rules of engagement.
reason for deep suspicion is the sophistication of the official cover-story
and speed with which it was disseminated*. De Menezes had been
directly linked to the bombings, he wearing a bulky jacket
in spite of warm weather. He had run into the station and vaulted over
the ticket barrier and had been shot by police after being chased onto
the train. This story has the hallmarks of being carefully crafted so
that it would appeal even to the sceptics. It was widely assumed by
people disturbed at his fate, that de Menezes was probably rather dark-skinned
and might have run when first challenged because he feared his pursuers
were white racist thugs. The picture deliberately created was of an
unfortunate misunderstanding resulting from the general climate of fear
the public response turned to revulsion and doubt it was subtly put
about that de Menezes had run from the police because he was an illegal
are just some of the questions that must urgently be addressed by an
open and independent inquiry with full powers to subpoena:
Who at Scotland Yard gave the Code Red order that allowed
the gunmen a licence to kill the subject? Was it Sir Ian Blair himself?
What was that persons relationship to the members of the armed
team? Who briefed the team?
Who were the armed team, and were they from, as has been
alleged, a military special operations group (like those made notorious
by their role in Ireland)? What are their career histories?
Who concocted the original police account of the events and peddled
it to the media?
*For a superb analysis
of the mainstream medias reporting of the killing and particularly
of the role of two supposed eye witnesses read
"Officer, there's hole in your bit bucket" by William Bowles.
duped the London bombers?
GATENBY, Possum News Network
18 July 2005
police and MI5 sources, The Mirror.co.uk, a mainstream British internet
publication, has now admitted the probability that the four London bombers
were in some way duped by a master bomber . This theory has been widely
reported internationally (for example by the Sydney Morning Herald,
18 July 2005).
In the Mirrors scenario the master bomber cynically tricked his
team into thinking that when they pressed the button, they were setting
off a timing device that would give them sufficient time to leave the
target area. Instead, they pressed the buttons, detonated the bombs
and killed themselves as well as their victims.
According to this scenario the bombers were merely expendable low-level
operatives whose death would happily remove the probability that, if
caught, they would reveal, under interrogation, details about their
controllers and other members of the network.
In its way, this admission is a breakthrough that should allow other
more plausible scenarios to emerge for investigation. READ
THE FULL ARTICLE >>>